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THE KEY TO THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: THE
EFFECT OF ASHCROFT V. IQBAL AND THE
HEIGHTENED PLEADING STANDARD
Michael Eaton*
I. INTRODUCTION
Anyone who has studied law in the past half century is
familiar with Conley v. Gibson' and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which, together, eliminated the rigid code
pleading system for civil complaints,' and ushered in the
modem era of "notice pleading."' The Supreme Court's 2007
decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,4 left many
commentators wondering whether "[n]otice pleading is
dead."' In Twombly, the Court articulated a new standard,
which has come to be known as "plausibility pleading,"'
whereby a complaint must "state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face."7 With its recent decision in Ashcroft v.
* Senior Comments Editor of Volume 51 of the Santa Clara Law Review;
J.D. Candidate 2011 at Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A. in History
and Economics from McGill University. I would like to thank the Board of
Editors of the Santa Clara Law Review for their contribution to the publication
of this comment. I would also like to thank Mia Butera as well as my family and
friends for all of their support throughout law school.
1. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. Code pleading required a plaintiff to allege "[a] plain and concise
statement of the facts constituting each cause of action without unnecessary
repetition." CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING
210 (2d ed. 1947).
3. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48 ("Such simplified 'notice pleading' is made
possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial
procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both
claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.").
4. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
5. A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431
(2008).
6. Id.
7. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
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Iqbal, the Supreme Court appears to have placed the
proverbial final nail in the notice pleading coffin, accepting
the "plausibility standard" with open arms.' The decision has
created serious doubts about the efficacy of the notice
pleading system and has raised concerns about plaintiffs'
constitutional rights to access courts.'
On May 18, 2009 the Supreme Court delivered the
Ashcroft v. Iqbal opinion, ruling that Iqbal-a Pakistani
Muslim claiming constitutional violations stemming from his
detention as part of a post-September 11th national security
protocol-failed to allege factual allegations in his complaint
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.' While Iqbal is
significant as a qualified immunity case against high-ranking
government officials," the decision is most notable for its
effects on the civil pleading standard. Across the country,
civil proceduralists and litigators alike watched as the
Supreme Court fully embraced the heightened pleading
standard articulated in Twombly as the proper pleading
standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).12 In
the first two months following the decision, litigators cited to
Iqbal as grounds for dismissing law suits more than five
hundred times in what are now known as "Iqbal motions."'
Iqbal also spawned a legislative response from Congress, with
Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania proposing a bill that
would overturn Iqbal's heightened pleading standard and
revive the lower standard articulated in Conley v. Gibson.'4
8. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009), rev'g Iqbal v. Hasty,
490 F.3d 143 (2009).
9. Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1296
(2010).
10. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-54.
11. See Michelle Spiegel, Comment, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Question of a
Heighted Standard of Pleading in Qualified Immunity Cases, 4 DUKE J. CONST.
LAw & PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 375, 376 (2009).
12. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
13. Adam Liptak, 9111 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2009, at A10. See Tony Mauro, Plaintiffs Groups Mount Effort
to Undo Supreme Court's 'Iqbal' Ruling, LAW.CoM, Sept. 21, 2009,
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendlyjsp?id=1202433931370 (stating
that "'Iqbal motions' to dismiss because of insufficient pleading have become
commonplace in federal courts, already producing more than 1,500 district court
and 100 appellate court decisions").
14. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009),
available at, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-sl504/text; Conley v. Gibson,
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More recently, Democratic lawmakers presented the Open
Access to Courts Act of 2009, which expands on Senator
Specter's proposed legislation by expressly overruling Iqbal
and carefully crafting a laxer pleading standard akin to that
in Conley."5
This comment will analyze the competing interpretations
of the Iqbal decision and evaluate the extent to which Iqbal
altered the standard of pleading from the era of notice
pleading. 16 It will also examine the real world application of
the Iqbal standard by analyzing three recent cases that were
dismissed on Iqbal grounds." Regardless of which
interpretation of Iqbal ultimately finds favor with legal
scholars, Iqbal has unquestionably erected substantial
barriers to the judicial system for certain plaintiffs that were
nonexistent under the notice pleading regime." This
comment will conclude by exploring various ways to remedy
the problem of limited access to courts while balancing the
competing institutional goal of preventing frivolous lawsuits
from reaching trial.'"
The remainder of this comment is divided into five parts.
Part II, which is divided into four subparts, will sketch the
historical backdrop of Iqbal.20 Subpart A will look at the
evolution of pleading standard jurisprudence, starting with
the landmark case of Conley v. Gibson,2 1 and its progeny.2 2
Subpart B will analyze the abrupt shift in the pleading
standard occasioned by Twombly, the immediate predecessor
to Iqbal.2 3 Subpart C will open with a brief discussion of the
Second Circuit's decision in Iqbal v. Hasty.24 This will be
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (holding that "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim").
15. Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009),
available at http://www.opencongress.org/billl 11-h4115/text.
16. See infra Part IV.A.
17. See infra Part IV.B.
18. See Liptak, supra note 13, at A10; see also Robert G. Bone, Twombly,
Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 875
(2009).
19. See discussion infra Part V.; see also Bone, supra note 18, at 875-76.
20. See infra Part II.
21. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2007); see infra Part II.C.
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followed by an in-depth analysis of the Court's decision in
Iqbal, and the Court's adoption of the "plausibility" pleading
requirement from Twombly. Finally, subpart D will
introduce three recent cases in which courts have applied the
Iqbal standard in an inconsistent manner.2 5
Part III will introduce the major problem posed by the
Iqbal decision: the possibility that meritorious claims will be
screened out by the heightened Iqbal pleading standard,
effectively denying plaintiffs the ability to access the courts
for judicial redress.26  This section will also briefly examine
the perceived effect the Iqbal decision has already had by
looking at the response of practitioners and legal scholars.
Part IV is divided into two subparts. Subpart A will
examine two competing interpretations of Iqbal: the
conventional vieW2 7-that sees Iqbal as bringing about the
end of notice pleading-and the competing view-that
attempts to reconcile the Supreme Court's abrupt shift in
Twombly, with its earlier liberal pleading precedent.28
Subpart B will provide a cross section of the judicial
application of the new pleading standard, analyzing the
distinct and often inconsistent applications of this standard in
the context of the three recent lower-court decisions
introduced in Part II.D.2 9
In Part V, this comment will discuss various alternative
means by which a balance can be struck between a
heightened pleading standard and liberal access to the
judicial system.o It will also briefly highlight the legislative
response to the Iqbal decision, including the legislative
attempt to overturn Iqbal in favor of returning to the earlier
"notice pleading" standard from Conley.
II. HISTORICAL BACKDROP OF IQBAL
A. Notice Pleading: Conley v. Gibson and its Progeny
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a
complaint provide "a short and plain statement of the claim
25. See infra Part II.D.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
28. Steinman, supra note 9, at 1351-56; see infra Part IV.A.
29. See infra Part V.B.
30. See infra Part V.
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showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."3' The adoption
of the "short and plain statement" standard marked a
significant departure from the rigid system of code pleading
under which the complainant was burdened with pleading
"ultimate facts rather than mere evidentiary facts or
conclusions."" In the now iconic language from Conley, the
Supreme Court coined the term "notice pleading," holding
that "all the Rules require is 'a short and plain statement of
the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."3
The Court emphasized that the Rules "do not require a
claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his
claim," and instead allow a claimant to rely on discovery to
"disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense
and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues."34
In the nearly half-century following Conley, the Supreme
Court had several occasions to reconsider the pleading
standard, each time refusing to heighten it beyond the notice
pleading standard articulated in Conley. 5 In Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics and Coordination Unit, the
Supreme Court was confronted with a heightened pleading
standard crafted by the Fifth Circuit for civil rights claims
alleging municipal liability." The Supreme Court upheld
Conley in a unanimous opinion, restating Conley's holding
that "Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint include only 'a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.""' The Court acknowledged that
Rule 9(b) "does impose a particularity requirement in two
specific instances," but the Court refused the invitation to
extend the heightened pleading requirement beyond those
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
32. See Spencer, supra note 5, at 434 (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)).
33. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998); Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
36. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 165-66 (reiterating respondent's argument
that the Fifth Circuit's heightened pleading standard was justified by protecting
municipalities from time-consuming discovery in respondeat superior claims).
37. Id. at 168.
2011] 303
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enumerated exceptions.3 8 Finally, the Court expressed
deference to the Federal Rules Amendment process,
indicating that "[i]n the absence of... an amendment, federal
courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and
control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner
rather than later."3 9
The Court followed the same logic in Crawford-El v.
Britton, expressly rejecting a heightened pleading standard in
a civil rights case brought by a prisoner against a corrections
officer for alleged constitutional violations. 4 0  Again, the
Court expressed reluctance to use judicial authority to alter
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, noting that its "cases
demonstrate that questions regarding pleading, discovery,
and summary judgment are most frequently and most
effectively resolved either by the rulemaking process or the
legislative process."' Cognizant of the problems of a lower
pleading standard that could permit unmeritorious claims to
proceed to trial, the Court suggested alternative means by
which trial courts could handle frivolous lawsuits, especially
claims against public officials who assert the defense of
qualified immunity. 42 The Court pointed to textual provisions
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that could minimize or
prevent potentially burdensome discovery, including ordering
a reply to the defendant's answer under Rule 7(a), or granting
motions for more definite statements pursuant to Rule
12(e).43 Finally, and of greater importance to the later
decision in Iqbal, the Court suggested the possibility of
requiring "specific, nonconclusory factual allegations" in suits
against government officials alleging unconstitutional
motive. Nevertheless, despite acknowledging the relative
ease with which a plaintiff can allege an unconstitutional
motive and the corresponding difficulty of disproving such a
38. Id. (refusing to extend FRCP 9(b) particularity requirements beyond
claims of fraud or mistake).
39. Id. at 168-69.
40. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 594 ("Neither the text of § 1983 or any other
federal statute, nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provide any support
for imposing the clear and convincing burden of proof on plaintiffs either at the
summary judgment stage or in the trial itself.").
41. Id. at 595.
42. Id. at 597-98.
43. Id. at 598. See FED. R. CIv. P. 7(a), 12(e).
44. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 582-83.
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motive, the Court rejected a heightened standard of proof.45
More recently, in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema,4 6 the Supreme
Court decided whether a heightened pleading standard
should apply in the context of an employment discrimination
claim brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.^' In a unanimous opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court
held that "complaints in these cases, as in most others, must
satisfy only the simple requirements of Rule 8(a),"4 8 and must
merely "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."49 The Court
emphasized that "Rule 8(a) establishes a pleading standard
without regard to whether a claim will succeed on the
merits," stating that "[i]ndeed it may appear on the face of the
pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that
is not the test."s0 Thus, after Swierkiewicz, the proper role of
the courts at the pleading stage is to inquire whether the
complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted
assuming that the allegations in the complaint are ultimately
proven true." As it did in both Leatherman and Crawford-El,
the Court once again acknowledged the judiciary's lack of
authority to rewrite the pleading standard, emphasizing that
"[a] requirement of greater specificity for particular claims is
a result that 'must be obtained by the process of amending
the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation."'5 2
B. Plausibility Pleading: Bell Atlantic Corporation v.
Twombly
With its decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the
Supreme Court seemingly upended fifty years of case law
precedent, which had consistently held that a complaint
should not be dismissed unless it is "beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
45. Id. at 597-99.
46. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
47. Id. at 509.
48. Id. at 513.
49. Id. at 512 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
50. Id. at 515 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
51. Id. at 508 n.1.
52. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (quoting Leatherman
v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
168 (1993)).
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would entitle him to relief."13  In Twombly, the plaintiffs
brought an anti-trust class action suit against incumbent
local telephone and internet exchange carriers under section
1 of the Sherman Act.5 4 In a split decision, the Court
dismissed the plaintiffs' claim at the pleading stage, finding
the complaint contained mere "allegation[s] of parallel
conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy," which failed to
"nudge [] their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible."" With this holding came the advent of
"plausibility" pleading,56 under which a complaint must
contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.""
In response to the argument that the Court's analysis
disregarded earlier precedent," the Court explained that, in
practice, Conley's "no set of facts" standard had fostered
confusion, and garnered criticism by judges and
commentators who "have balked at taking the literal terms of
the Conley passage as a pleading standard."59 The Court held
that the Conley standard "is best forgotten as an incomplete,
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard,"" because it
would permit a complaint to survive despite the absence of a
"'reasonably founded hope' that a plaintiff would be able to
make a case."6  In support of the "plausibility" standard, the
53. Anthony Martinez, Plausibility Among the Circuits: An Empirical
Survey of Bel' Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 61 ARK. L. REV. 763, 763 (2009)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
54. Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 548 (2007). As stated by the
Court, the issue in the case was "whether a § 1 complaint can survive a motion
to dismiss when it alleges that major telecommunications providers engaged in
certain parallel conduct unfavorable to competition, absent some factual context
suggesting agreement, as distinct from identical, independent action." Id.
(referencing the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (West 2006)).
55. Id. at 556, 570.
56. Martinez, supra note 53, at 763.
57. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
58. Plaintiffs argued-citing Swierkiewicz, the most recent case on pleading
standards at the time-that similar to claims in the context of employment
discrimination, the complaint here need not contain specific facts alleging a
prima facie case. Id. at 569. Plaintiffs asserted that "transpos[ing] 'plus factor'
summary judgment analysis woodenly into a rigid Rule 12(b)(6) pleading
standard .. . would be unwise." Id.
59. Id. at 562.
60. Id. at 563.
61. Id. at 562 (quoting Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347
(2005)).
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majority reasoned that the standard "reflects the threshold
requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the 'plain statement' possess
enough heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" 62
C. The Iqbal Decision: Plausibility Pleading Goes Mainstream
In the immediate wake of Twombly, there were questions
about the efficacy of the Court's newly adopted "plausibility"
standard outside the antitrust context." Confusion within
the legal community was compounded by the Court's decision
in Erickson v. Pardus,"4 in which the Court, just three weeks
after Twombly, upheld the sufficiency of a complaint without
mentioning the plausibility standard.' 5 Critics of the new
plausibility standard voiced concern that the heightened
standard would have an adverse effect on plaintiffs' right to
access courts, and "[cloncerns about Twombly have been
exacerbated by Iqbal, which eliminated any hope that
Twombly might be narrowly confined to complex antitrust
cases."67  In Iqbal, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
dispelled any confusion, explicitly holding that, though
Twombly involved alleged antitrust violations, "[the] decision
... expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions,' and
it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike."6
In Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim named Javid Iqbal claimed
law enforcement subjected him to unconstitutional actions
while he was confined in the Metropolitan Detention Center
in Brooklyn, New York.6 ' Following the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, the FBI and Immigration and
Naturalization Service arrested Iqbal on charges of fraud and
conspiracy to defraud the United States in relation to his
identification documents.o While confined, Iqbal was
62. Id. at 557 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
63. Ashby Jones, Why Defense Lawyers are Lovin' the Iqbal Decision,
WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 19, 2009, available at
http//blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/05/19/why-defense-lawyers-are-lovin-the-iqbal-
decision/.
64. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-95 (2007).
65. Bone, supra note 18, at 883.
66. Id. at 875-76.
67. Steinman, supra note 9, at 1296.
68. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009), rev'g Iqbal v. Hasty, 490
F.3d 143 (2009) (citation omitted).
69. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147-148 (2nd Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
70. Id. at 147-48, 148 n.1.
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designated a "high interest" inmate and separated from the
general prison population in a maximum security special
housing unit, where prison guards allegedly subjected him to
excessive searches and unconstitutional conditions. In
response to his detention, Iqbal filed suit against various
government officials, including Attorney General John
Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller. 7 2
Iqbal's complaint alleged that, as part of the FBI's
investigation into the September 11th attacks, "all Arab
Muslim men arrested on criminal or immigration charges ...
however unrelated the arrestee was to the investigation-
were immediately classified as of interest,"7 3 and that
defendants had "designated respondent a person of high
interest on account of his race, religion, or national origin, in
contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments to the
Constitution." 74 Iqbal identified John Ashcroft as "a principal
architect of the policies and practices challenged here . . .[,
who] authorized, condoned, and/or ratified the unreasonable
and excessively harsh conditions under which [p]laintiffs
71. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943-44. The Special Housing Unit incorporated the
maximum security conditions allowable under Federal Bureau of Prisons
regulations, and detainees were kept in lockdown twenty-three hours per day,
and allowed little more than an hour outside their cells, during which they were
restrained by handcuffs and leg irons, and accompanied by a four-officer escort.
Id. at 1943. Iqbal alleged that while detained,
jailors "kicked him in the stomach, punched him in the face, and
dragged him across" his cell without justification [and] subjected him to
serial strip and body-cavity searches when he posed no safety risk to
himself or others and refused to let him and other Muslims pray
because there would be "[n]o prayers for terrorists."
Id. at 1944 (citations omitted).
72. Hasty, 490 F.3d. at 147. Iqbal filed a "Bivens action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York against 34 current and
former federal officials and 19 'John Doe' federal corrections officers." Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1943 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971)). In addition to defendants Ashcroft and Mueller, Iqbal also
filed suit against Michael Rolince, former Chief of the FBI's International
Terrorism Operations Section, Counterterrorism Division; Kenneth Maxwell,
former Assistant Special Agent in charge of the FBI's New York Field Office;
Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, former Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") Director; David
Rardin, former Director of the Northeast region of the BOP; Michael Cooksey,
former Assistant Director for Correctional Programs of the BOP; Dennish
Hasty, former Metropolitan Detention Center ("MDC") Warden; and Michael
Zenk, MDC Warden. Hasty, 490 F.3d. at 148.
73. First Am. Complaint 52, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-1809
(E.D.N.Y. 2005), 2004 WL 3756442.
74. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944.
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were detained.""5 Similarly, Iqbal alleged that Robert
Mueller, "[als FBI Director, . . . was instrumental in the
adoption, promulgation, and implementation of the policies
and practices challenged here."" The complaint specifically
claimed that defendants "each knew of, condoned, and
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [plaintiffs to these
conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on
account of their religion, race, and/or national origin and for
no legitimate penological interest."77  The defendants,
including Ashcroft and Mueller, filed motions to dismiss the
twenty-one claims asserted in the complaint, but the district
court held that most of these claims were not amenable to
resolution on a motion to dismiss.'
On appeal in Iqbal v. Hasty, the Second Circuit first
addressed the issue of the applicable pleading standard in the
wake of the recent Twombly decision.79 The court interpreted
the "conflicting signals" regarding the pleading standard as
75. First Am. Complaint, supra note 73, 110. Iqbal was initially joined by
co-plaintiff Ehab Elmaghraby, an Egyptian Muslim, who subsequently settled
with the United States for $300,000, and thus did not participate in the appeal.
Hasty, 490 F.3d at 147, rev'd sub nom Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
76. First Am. Complaint, supra note 73, 11.
77. Id. 96.
78. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-1809, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y.
Sep. 27, 2005). The district court denied defendants' motions to dismiss on the
following claims: Claim 1, Fifth Amendment substantive due process claim
based on the conditions of confinement; Claim 2, Fifth Amendment procedural
due process claim based on confinement in ADMAX SHU; Claims 3-4, Fifth and
Eighth Amendments excessive force claims; Claim 5, Sixth Amendment
interference with right to counsel claim; Claims 6-7, Fifth and Eighth
Amendments denial of medical treatment claims; Claim 8, conditions of
confinement claim; Claim 10, First Amendment claim based on interference
with religious practice; and Claim 21, Alien Tort Claims Act claim. The district
court granted defendants' motions to dismiss the following claims: Claim 13,
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) claim based on conditions of
confinement; and Claims 14-15, RFRA claims based on interference with
religious practice and excessive force. The court granted in part and denied in
part the defendants' motions to dismiss on the following claims: Claim 9, Fourth
Amendment unreasonable search claim based on strip and body-cavity searches;
Claim 11, First Amendment claim based on religious discrimination; Claim 12,
Fifth Amendment race-based equal protection claim; Claims 16-17, 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) claims for conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of equal protection on the
grounds of religion, race, and national origin. Id. Defendants appealed the
district court's denial of their motions to dismiss on qualified immunity
grounds. Hasty, 490 F.3d. at 151.
79. Hasty, 490 F.3d. at 155-58; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
548 (2007).
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"not requiring a universal standard of heightened fact
pleading," but rather a "flexible 'plausibility standard.'""
Despite acknowledging the importance of protecting public
officials from undue harassment by litigation, the court
concluded that "a heightened pleading rule may not be
imposed."" Next, turning to Iqbal's complaint, the court
acknowledged that "some of the allegations in the [p]laintiff's
complaint . .. are based not on facts supporting the claim but,
rather, on generalized allegations of supervisory
involvement"; but, nonetheless, it found the allegations
sufficient.8 2 Explicitly recognizing the low hurdle a complaint
must surmount to survive a motion to dismiss, the court
noted that it "need not consider at [that] stage of the
litigation whether [the] allegations [were] alone sufficient to
state a clearly established constitutional violation."" Finally,
the Second Circuit found the allegations against Ashcroft and
Mueller sufficient to "satisfly] the plausibility standard
without an allegation of subsidiary facts because of the
likelihood that [the] senior officials would have concerned
themselves with the formulation and implementation of
policies dealing with the confinement of those arrested ...
and designated 'of high interest' in the aftermath of 9/11.""'
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court similarly began
with an analysis of pleading standard jurisprudence in light
of Twombly, identifying two main principles as underlying
the plausibility pleading standard." First, the Court held
that the basic principle that a court must accept all
allegations in a complaint as true applies only to factual
allegations and not legal conclusions. While recognizing
that "legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint," the Court emphasized that "[t]hreadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice."87 Despite the fact that
Rule 8 marks a notable departure from the hyper-technical
80. Hasty, 490 F.3d. at 157-58.
81. Id. at 158.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 175.
84. Id.
85. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009), rev'g Iqbal v. Hasty,
490 F.3d 143 (2009).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1949.
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code pleading, "it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions."" The
Court rejected the argument that it was imposing a Rule 9(b)
particularity requirement, when Rule 8 only requires malice,
intent, and knowledge to be alleged generally. 9 "Generally,"
the Court reasoned, "is a relative term," and the fact that
plaintiffs allegations do not fall within the heightened
pleading standard of Rule 9(b) "does not give him license to
evade the less rigid-though still operative-strictures of
Rule 8."90 Second, "only a complaint that states a plausible
claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss," a determination
that requires a context specific analysis by the trial judge,
who must rely on his or her "judicial experience and common
sense."9 '
Applying the Twombly pleading standard to Iqbal's
complaint, the Court began its opinion by addressing those
allegations that it deemed were "not entitled to the
assumption of truth."92 First, the Court found insufficient the
charge that defendants
"[K]new of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed
to subject [him]" to harsh conditions of confinement "as a
matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race,
and/or national origin" . . . [] that Ashcroft was the
"principal architect" of this invidious policy . . . , and that
Mueller was "instrumental" in adopting and executing it.93
The Court found that the complaint, instead of sufficiently
pleading conspiracy, amounted to "nothing more than a
'formulaic recitation of the elements' of a constitutional
discrimination claim."9 4 The Court clarified that it was not
rejecting the allegations on the ground that they were
unrealistic or nonsensical, but rather because of their
"conclusory nature . . . , [which] disentitles them to the
presumption of truth.""
Next, the Court applied the plausibility standard to the
88. Id. at 1949-50.
89. Id. at 1954; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
90. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)).
91. Id. at 1950.
92. Id. at 1951.
93. Id. (quoting First Am. Complaint, supra note 73, 1 10-11).
94. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
95. Id.
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remaining allegations against Rumsfeld and Mueller.9 6 The
Court addressed the claim that "[t]he policy of holding post-
September-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of
confinement until they were 'cleared' by the FBI was
approved by [dlefendants [Ashcroft and Mueller] in
discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.""1 While
acknowledging that, taken as true, these contentions were
consistent with the complaint's allegations that plaintiffs
were singled out on account of their race, religion, or national
origin, the Court found that "given more likely explanations
[of national security and public safety], they do not plausibly
establish this purpose."9 The Court further noted that "[als
between th[e] 'obvious alternative explanation' for the arrests,
and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks
us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.""
Thus, given the more probable explanations, the Court
refused to accept Iqbal's unsubstantiated allegation that
defendants adopted the policy with the intent to
discriminate. 00
The majority identified an additional deficiency in the
Iqbal complaint, noting that even if the complaint had given
rise to a plausible inference of unconstitutional
discrimination, the facts alleged would go to the
unconstitutionality of the arrest and detention, not the
alleged discriminatory policy.101 Since the plaintiffs claims
alleged an unconstitutional policy based on race, religion and
national origin classifications, the complaint needed to
contain facts plausibly showing that defendants purposely
adopted such discriminatory policies.'0 2 The Court
distinguished Twombly, where the actions of subordinates
96. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009), rev'g Iqbal v. Hasty, 490
F.3d 143 (2009).
97. Id. (quoting First Am. Complaint, supra note 73, 69).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1951-52 (citation omitted). The Court noted that any legitimate
policy directing law enforcement to detain individuals because of their
suspected link to the September 11, 2001 attacks would produce a disparate,
incidental impact on Arab Muslims, despite the fact that the purpose of the
policy was not to target Arabs or Muslims specifically. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1952.
102. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009), rev'g Iqbal v. Hasty, 490
F.3d 143 (2009).
[Vol:51312
KEY TO THE COURTHOUSE DOOR
could bind corporate defendants under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, since no similar theory of liability
applied for the government defendants.' 0' Accordingly, the
failure of plaintiffs' complaint to allege a factual basis
sufficient to plausibly suggest defendant's discriminatory
state of mind failed to "'nudge] [his] claims' of invidious
discrimination 'across the line from conceivable to
plausible.' "104
D. Plausibility Pleading Post-Iqbal
Following the Supreme Court's decision, Iqbal motions to
dismiss became commonplace in federal courts with
remarkable speed and success.' 05 Five hundred cases cited
Iqbal in the two months following the decision,' and the
number of citations exploded to nearly three thousand by
mid-summer 2009.107 Three major cases dismissed on Iqbal
grounds included a suit against a major pharmaceutical
company and makers of the antipsychotic drug Seroquel,10 a
claim under the Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victims
Protection Act against Coca-Cola,' 9 and a claim by a Muslim
woman challenging the Federal government's no-fly list as
unconstitutional profiling.110 The varying interpretations of
Iqbal, as illustrated by these three cases, will be analyzed in
the latter part of this comment.
III. THE HEIGHTENED PLEADING STANDARD: SHUTTING THE
DOOR To MERITORIOUS CLAIMS?
The pleading stage marks the entry point for individual
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
105. Mauro, supra note 13.
106. Liptak, supra note 13, at A10.
107. Kristina Peterson, US Dem Reps Craft Bill to Prevent Easily
Dismissing Lawsuits, Dow JONES NEWSWIRES, Oct. 27, 2009,
available at http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/stock-market-news-
story.aspx?storyid=200910271746dowjonesdjonlineOO0543&title=us-dem-reps-
craft-bill-to-prevent-easily-dismissing-lawsuits.
108. Pa. Employees Benefit Trust Fund v. Astrazeneca Pharm. Inc., No. 6:09-
ev-5003-Orl-22DAB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76555, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 20,
2009).
109. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1257 (11th Cir. 2009).
110. Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64619, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 27, 2009).
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access to the judicial system, which is inextricably linked to
the distribution of social and political power within our
society."' Consequently, heightening the pleading standard
not only affects the ability of individual plaintiffs to proceed
to court-supervised discovery, present evidence to a judge or
jury, and obtain a judicial remedy: it also triggers intense
societal controversy over the judicial system's accessibility.112
Proponents of a heightened pleading standard point to abuses
of the liberal pleading system where "meritless plaintiffs ...
are able to get past the pleading stage and use the threat of
discovery to leverage a large settlement.""3  Yet opponents
note that substantive information about the defendant's
wrongdoing is often not available to plaintiffs." 4 Certain
types of plaintiffs, especially those "claiming they were the
victims of employment discrimination, a defective product, an
antitrust conspiracy or a policy of harsh treatment in
detention may not know exactly who harmed them and how
before filing suit. . . [blut [these] plaintiffs can learn valuable
information during discovery.""' Undoubtedly, Iqbal has
generated a growing policy debate that pits advocates of a
liberal pleading standard against those who perceive
plausibility pleading as a way of weeding out "weak or
frivolous lawsuits," and reducing the federal courts'
caseloads.116  Some commentators are also concerned that
Iqbal's heightened pleading standard contravenes the
Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in civil
cases.117
Despite the ongoing policy debate, both sides can agree
that after Iqbal the pleading standard is notably higher, and
a plaintiff seeking judicial redress must satisfy a "skeptical
judicial gatekeeper." 8 Plaintiffs face a Catch-22 situation
under the Iqbal standard, whereby a complaint must state
enough factual matter to satisfy the plausibility standard and
proceed to discovery, but must do so without the benefit of
111. Bone, supra note 18, at 875.
112. See Stein-man, supra note 9, at 1294; see also Bone, supra note 18, at
875.
113. Bone, supra note 18, at 887.
114. See Liptak, supra note 13, at A10.
115. Id.
116. See Mauro, supra note 13.
117. See id.
118. Liptak, supra note 13, at A10.
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discovery to gather that information.' 9  Accordingly, a
remedial measure is necessary to effectively balance the right
of plaintiffs to judicial redress while preventing opportunistic
claimants from abusing the judicial system.
IV. COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS AND INCONSISTENT
APPLICATIONS OF IQBAL
A. Differing Views of Iqbal
While Iqbal appears to have retired notice pleading
wholesale, a growing scholarly debate has emerged over the
proper interpretation of Iqbal's effect on pleading
standards. 120 The "conventional interpretation"121 views
Iqbal as creating a new role for the trial judge as a "skeptical
judicial gatekeeper," whom the complainant must satisfy
before proceeding to the discovery phase.12 2  This
interpretation is based, in part, on the Iqbal majority's
observation that determining plausibility will require the
trial court to "draw on its judicial experience and common
sense."'12  Many have interpreted this phrase as instilling the
power to dismiss a claim in the trial judge "simply because
the allegations strike him or her as implausible-not based
on any testimony or other evidence."124
The generally accepted interpretation also posits that the
heightened plausibility pleading standard is a Catch-22,
whereby plaintiffs with meritorious claims may need
discovery to uncover sufficient factual basis to support their
claims; however, faced with heightened pleading standards,
their claims are likely to be dismissed for lack of factual basis
before they are permitted to proceed to the discovery phase.'2 5
119. See Mauro, supra note 13.
120. See Steinman, supra note 9, at 1296-97.
121. Due to the relative recency of the Iqbal decision, the general
interpretation has not yet yielded many law review articles, but has garnered
considerable attention in the legal news and on legal blogs. Adam Steinman
differentiates between the widely accepted interpretation of Iqbal and his
proposed interpretation, referring to the former as the "conventional reading of
Twombly and Iqbal." Id. at 1310.
122. Liptak, supra note 13, at A10.
123. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009), rev'g Iqbal v. Hasty, 490
F.3d 143 (2009).
124. Steinman, supra note 9, at 1310.
125. See Mauro, supra note 13.
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Legal scholars have noted that a stricter pleading standard
"risks screening out meritorious cases when investigation
costs are too high for plaintiffs to obtain the necessary
information before filing." 2 6  Furthermore, there may be
"information asymmetries" between the parties that
significantly disadvantage certain types of plaintiffs.12 7  A
case in point is Mr. Iqbal, an incarcerated Pakistani Muslim,
suing Mr. Ashcroft and Mr. Mueller, two national security
titans with vastly superior access to information. 12
In his article, entitled The Pleading Problem, Professor
Adam N. Steinman of the University of Cincinnati College of
Law offers a competing interpretation of Iqbal.12 Despite the
conventional view that Iqbal and Twombly disregarded fifty
years of notice pleading precedent, Professor Steinman
advances two core principles to support his proposal that
these cases are actually consistent with the Supreme Court's
longstanding notice pleading approach.3 0
First, Professor Steinman argues that the proper initial
inquiry under Iqbal and Twombly is whether an allegation is
conclusory, as opposed to a freeform assessment of
plausibility.13 ' So long as an allegation is not conclusory, it is
entitled to a presumption of validity without inquiry into its
plausibility.132  Accordingly, under Professor Steinman's
interpretation, it is possible to avoid the plausibility inquiry
entirely when the complaint contains "nonconclusory
allegations on every element of the claim for relief."3 3
Professor Steinman suggests that a complaint that provides
non-conclusory allegations on every element of the claim "by
126. Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 589
(1997).
127. Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What
Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power Over
Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1263 (2008).
128. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942. Of course, Iqbal implicates other issues in
addition to informational inequalities. Specifically, the role of the qualified
immunity defense for high-ranking government officials which "freels] officials
from the concerns of litigation, including 'avoidance of disruptive discovery.'"
Id. at 1953 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991)).
129. Steinman, supra note 9, at 1298.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1314-15.
132. Id. at 1316 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009), rev'g
Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2009)).
133. Id.
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definition, exceeds the threshold of plausibility." 134  As
applied to Iqbal and Twombly, Steinman believes the Court
dismissed the claims in both cases because they were
conclusory, not because they were implausible.13 5
Professor Steinman sees irony in the conventional
interpretation of Iqbal and Twombly, which views plausibility
as a threat to the liberal pleading system.'3 6 Steinman notes
that "[o]nly conclusoriness is grounds for refusing to accept an
allegation as true" whereas "[pilausiblity is grounds for
assuming as true something that is not validly alleged in the
complaint."137 Thus, unlike conclusory allegations, which are
"destructive" because they justify disregarding an allegation,
plausibility is "generative," because it "justifies creating an
allegation that is not validly made in the complaint itself."138
Contrary to the conventional interpretation, therefore,
Steinman argues that "the plausibility aspect of Twombly and
Iqbal makes the pleading standard more forgiving, not
less."
Second, the vast majority of the pre-Twombly case law
remains good law.140  The Twombly decision unequivocally
"retired" the Conley "no set of facts" maxim; 14 1 however, as
134. Id. However, this interpretation may be subject to attack on the
grounds that it confuses the concepts of plausibility and possibility. The
Twombly court differentiated between "conceivable" and "plausible," holding
that the latter is necessary to survive the pleading stage; however, it may be
possible for a complaint to contain non-conclusory allegations on every element,
yet not satisfy the threshold "plausibility" requirement. See Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
135. Steinman, supra note 9, at 1316. (arguing that the Iqbal court
disregarded the conclusory allegations of Ashcroft and Mueller's discriminatory
motive, leaving no allegations of such motive remaining, and in Twombly, after
the conclusory allegations of illegal agreement were excised, the remaining
allegations failed to sufficiently allege a cause of action under the Sherman
Act).
136. Id. at 1318-19.
137. Id. at 1319.
138. Id. (explaining that plausibility provides the grounds for the court to
assume something is true, despite the fact that it may not have been properly
pleaded).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1320-21 (arguing that important pre-Twombly decisions have not
been overruled and thus remain good law, but not specifically addressing
Leatherman).
141. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007) (retiring the
standard that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
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the Twombly majority indicates, trial courts rarely took this
language literally.14 2 Moreover, neither Twombly nor Iqbal
suggest that the Court is now claiming the power to judicially
amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' 43 especially
given the Court's deference to the Rules Amendment process
in earlier decisions.14
Furthermore, Professor Steinman notes that the text of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and judicial precedent
preclude an interpretation of Iqbal that would disregard
allegations as conclusory solely because the truth of the
allegation is not supported by another allegation in the
complaint. 1'5 The very nature of the complaint is such that it
contains only allegations and, thus, requiring evidentiary
support for each allegation would result in entire complaints
being deemed conclusory."' The Federal Rules lend support
to this view, because a strict evidentiary requirement at the
pleading stage conflates the distinction between a motion to
dismiss and a motion for summary judgment, with only the
latter requiring sufficient evidence to support a claim.14 7
Additionally, Professor Steinman points to Rule 11, under
which the filer of any document certifies that it is factually
supported or will be after an opportunity for discovery, as
proof that discovery may be necessary to substantiate an
allegation."s Similarly, in Swierkiewicz, which Professor
Steinman argues has not been overruled, the Court expressly
rejected the suggestion that a complaint must indicate the
availability of supporting evidence because the discovery
process "might reveal evidence of discrimination that was not
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief").
142. Id. at 562; see also Steinman, supra note 9, at 1331.
143. Steinman, supra note 9, at 1320.
144. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993); see also Crawford-El v. Britton,
523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998).
145. Steinman, supra note 9, at 1328-33.
146. Id. at 1329.
147. Id. at 1330 ("[If we graft an evidentiary requirement onto the pleadings
phase, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion would force a plaintiff, prior to any opportunity
for discovery, to present supporting evidence that normally would not be needed
until a summary judgment motion was filed.").
148. Id. at 1331 (providing that "factual contentions have evidentiary support
or . . . are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation and discovery") (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 11).
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yet known."149
Finally, Professor Steinman refutes the contention that
Iqbal requires a complaint to contain extensive detail about
the acts or events that it alleges.150  Professor Steinman
purports that the form complaints in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure support this view.' Specifically, Form 18
(for patent infringement)'5 2 and Form 17 (for breach of
contract to convey land)',3 deem sufficient general allegations
without substantial factual bases.'5 4 This suggests that the
conventional interpretation of Iqbal as radically altering the
pleading standard is not necessarily accurate because Iqbal
and Twombly can be read as consistent with the Supreme
Court's longstanding notice pleading approach.'55  As
discussed in the next section, however, Professor Steinman's
approach, despite being well-reasoned, is not wholly reflected
in the case law that has emerged since Iqbal. 16
B. Application of "Plausibility Pleading" Post-Iqbal
Three post-Iqbal cases offer examples of the inconsistent
application of the plausibility pleading standard."' An early
application-Pennsylvania Employees Benefit Trust Fund v.
Astrazeneca Pharmaceuticals-offered a straightforward
"conventional" application of the Supreme Court's Iqbal
149. Steinman, supra note 9, at 1332 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534
U.S. 506, 509 (2002)).
150. Id. at 1343-44.
151. Id.
152. FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 18, 13 (indicating as sufficient a complaint that
"defendant has infringed and is still infringing the Letters Patent by making,
selling, and using electric motors that embody the patented invention").
153. FED. R. Civ. P. FORM 17, 13 (indicating as sufficient a complaint that
"the plaintiff tendered the purpose price and requested a conveyance of the
land, but the defendant refused to accept the money or make a conveyance").
154. Steinman, supra note 9, at 1343-44
155. Professor Steinman made this suggestion in a prior draft of his article;
however, he did not include it in the published version. See Adam N. Steinman,
The Pleading Problem, (January 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (Professor Steinman made this suggestion in a prior draft of his
article; however, he did not include it in the published version).
156. See infra Part IV.B.
157. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009);
Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
64619 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2009); Pa. Employees Benefit Trust Fund v.
Astrazeneca Pharm. Inc. No. 6:09-cv-5003-Orl-22DAB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
76555 (M.D. Fla. July 20, 2009).
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pleading standard."I In Astrazeneca, the plaintiff, a state-
operated health and welfare trust fund, brought claims
against Astrazeneca, the maker of an antipsychotic drug, for
fraudulent marketing practices, resulting in the submission
of medically unnecessary claims for the drug to plaintiff, as
well as costs to the plaintiff because of the drug's adverse
health consequences.' Plaintiffs complaint specifically
alleged that through defendant's labeling, sales, marketing,
and "documents given or shown to physicians treating
[Pennsylvania Employees Benefit Trust Fund] participants
and/or PEBTF itself," defendant expressly warranted the
drug.16 0 Furthermore, the complaint alleged that defendant
warranted that Seroquel was fit and appropriate to treat
conditions other than those for which the drug was approved,
was fit for pediatric use, had no significant side effects other
than those identified on the label, and was safer and more
effective than less expensive alternative treatments.16 1
The district court held that, because they were
conclusory, the allegations in the complaint failed to meet the
Iqbal standard of pleading.'6 2 The court first disregarded the
claim that defendant had contacted plaintiff directly,
characterizing it as a "naked assertion ... [that was] vaguely
stated . . . [and] entirely unsupported by facts contained
elsewhere in the complaint."'6 3 Consistent with Iqbal, the
court held that it "need not credit [p]laintiffs bald allegations
... for purposes of the motion to dismiss."164 Likewise, the
court dismissed the allegation that the warranty was
communicated to plaintiff through intermediary
physicians.16 5  The trial judge specifically noted that the
complaint was "devoid of facts indicating whether and how
[p]laintiff itself became apprised of the alleged promises made
by defendant . . . and, further, how such alleged promises
became part of the 'basis of the bargain' with respect to
158. Astrazeneca, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76555, at *8-10.
159. Id. at *2.
160. Id. at *4.
161. Id. at *4-5.
162. Id. at *8.
163. Id.
164. Pa. Employees Benefit Trust Fund v. Astrazeneca Pharm. Inc. No. 6:09-
cv-5003-Orl-22DAB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76555, at *6 (M.D. Fla. July 20,
2009)
165. Id. at *10.
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[p1laintiff's reimbursement of the costs of Seroquel
prescriptions."' 6  While short of satisfying Iqbal, the
complaint would likely have stated enough under
Swierkiewicz, the immediate predecessor to Twombly,
because it "states a claim upon which relief can be granted
assuming that the allegations in the complaint are ultimately
proven true."1 6' Accordingly, the district court's literal
application of Iqbal resulted in the dismissal of a complaint
that might otherwise have survived pre-Iqbal.
One recent Eleventh Circuit case, Sinaltrainal v. Coca-
Cola, offers a unique example of Iqbal's application, because
it marks the intersection of the Iqbal pleading standard and a
strictly-defined statutory cause of action.e16  It is also notable
for the court's seemingly inconsistent application of the Iqbal
standard.'69  In Sinaltrainal, the plaintiffs, who were
Columbian trade union leaders, claimed that their employers,
Coca-Cola bottlers, collaborated with paramilitaries and local
police to murder and torture plaintiffs in violation of federal
law.170 Originally, plaintiffs filed a single complaint; later,
however, they amended it and divided it into four separate
complaints. 7' Each plaintiff brought a cause of action under
the Alien Tort Statute; however, three plaintiffs alleged a
conspiracy between the bottling facility management and
paramilitaries, which the court considered together, while the
fourth alleged a conspiracy with local police, which the court
considered separately.172
After restating the holdings of Iqbal and Twombly, the
court applied the heightened standard to the cause of action
brought by the three plaintiffs alleging a conspiracy between
the bottlers and paramilitaries.17 3 Under the statute,
166. Id. at *11-12
167. Steinman, supra note 9, at 1334 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534
U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002)).
168. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261-65 (11th Cir. 2009)
(deciding causes of actions under both the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. §
1350, and the Torture Victims Portection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, both of
which have clearly defined elements and have been the subject of extensive
judicial interpretation).
169. See id. at 1266-69.
170. Id. at 1257.
171. Id. at 1258.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1260-61.
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plaintiffs bore the burden of pleading that the paramilitaries,
who allegedly committed the murders and torture, did so
under color of law as state actors.174  The plaintiffs'
complaints alleged that the paramilitary are "permitted to
exist," and that "lilt is universally acknowledged that the
regular military and the civil government authorities . . .
tolerate the paramilitaries, allow them to operate, and often
cooperate, protect and/or work in concert with them." 7 1
Consistent with Iqbal, the court found the allegations
conclusory, not entitled to a presumption of truth and, thus,
insufficient to allege state-sponsored action in contravention
of the statute.1 76 The court's application of Iqbal to the first
three plaintiffs' causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute
was sound because plaintiffs' allegations amounted to no
more than "formulaic recitation that the paramilitary forces
were in a symbiotic relationship and were assisted by the
Columbian government."17 7
The remaining cause of action alleged a conspiracy
between the bottling facility's management and the local
police, rather than the paramilitary.178 The complaint alleged
that after plaintiffs participated in an organized labor strike
against the bottling plant management, the chief of security
for the plant falsely accused plaintiffs of planting a bomb in
the facility, causing the plaintiffs' arrest and detention. 17
The complaint further alleged that while in custody, plaintiffs
were brutally beaten, threatened at gunpoint, and
incarcerated for six month on false charges until they were
released after a prosecutor found the charges to be
baseless.18 0
Since the complaint provided more than "[tlhreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action," Iqbal commands
that the court "must accept [it] as true;"' 8  however, the
174. Id. at 1266.
175. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1266 (11th Cir. 2009).
176. Id.
177. Id. (explaining that Colombia's mere "registration and toleration of
private security forces does not transform those forces' acts into state acts")
(citation omitted).
178. Id. at 1267.
179. Id. at 1267-68.
180. Id. at 1268.
181. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), rev'g Iqbal v. Hasty, 490
F.3d 143 (2009).
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Eleventh Circuit appeared to jump directly to the
"plausibility" of the complaint. 182 Rather than inquire into
whether the allegations were conclusory, the court imported a
standard from the Alien Tort Statute jurisprudence, calling
the allegation of complicity between the police and the
bottling plant security chief an "unwarranted deduction of
fact . . . not admitted as true for the purpose of testing the
sufficiency of the allegations."1 3 Here, the court glossed over
the analysis of conclusory allegations and skipped directly to
the plausibility analysis. Yet, according to Professor
Steinman's interpretation of Iqbal, an allegation is entitled to
a presumption of validity without an inquiry into its
plausibility, so long as it is not conclusory. M The court
opined that the allegations of conspiracy were merely "based
on information and belief," and failed to provide the factual
content to allow the court "to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."185 In
so holding, the court offered a perfect example of the difficulty
of satisfying a "skeptical judicial gatekeeper," which the Iqbal
decision fashions as the proper role of the trial judge. 8 6
A third application of the Iqbal standard, and perhaps
the most interesting, is found in Ibrahim v. Dep't of
Homeland Security, which, like Iqbal, involved a claim of
unconstitutional discrimination in post-September 11, 2001
national security procedures."' Ibrahim, a Muslim woman
and citizen of Malaysia, challenged the federal government's
no-fly list,'8s claiming it was unconstitutional after she was
barred from boarding a plane because her name was flagged
despite allegedly having no criminal record and no ties to
terrorist activities. 8 9  According to Ibrahim, at the order of
182. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009).
183. Id. (citing Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248
(11th Cir. 2005)).
184. Steinman, supra note 9, at 1316 (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
185. Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1268 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949).
186. Liptak, supra note 13, at A10.
187. Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64619, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2009).
188. According to Ibrahim's allegations, the no-fly list consists of watch lists
that name individuals perceived to be threats to aviation security, including
those prohibited from traveling and those subject to additional screening prior
to boarding a plane. Id. at *8-9.
189. Id. at *9.
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defendant John Bondanella, an employee of the
Transportation Security Operations Center in Washington,
D.C., the San Francisco Police arrested Ibrahim and
subsequently detained her for questioning. 190
In relevant part, Ibrahim's complaint against Bondanella
alleged that he "directed the [San Francisco Police
Department] to arrest Ibrahim although he knew they lacked
a warrant, probable cause, or any reasonable belief that she
had committed a crime," and in so doing, "acted in a
discriminatory manner, with the intent to discriminate on the
basis of Ibrahim's religious beliefs and her national origin as
a citizen of Malaysia.""o' Likewise, her complaint against the
San Francisco Police Department defendants alleged that
Ibrahim "is informed and believes . . . that defendants made
the arrest despite these obvious deficiencies because they
perceived she was Muslim and a citizen of Malaysia."'9 2
In its opinion, the district court formulaically recited the
Iqbal standard as grounds for dismissing Ibrahim's
complaint. 9 3  Noting that "[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements do not suffice," the court held that plaintiffs
allegations "[were] conclusory and not enough to allow
Ibrahim to proceed with her discrimination claims against
either the San Francisco defendants or Bondanella."194
However, despite dismissing the bulk of Ibrahim's
constitutional claims, the court permitted one cause of
action-the Fourth Amendment claim-to go forward since it
was unchallenged by the defendant's motion to dismiss.9 9
The surviving allegation occasioned a unique application
of the Iqbal standard, essentially resulting in a judicial
portage around Iqbal's heightened pleading standard. The
trial judge explicitly recognized the difficulties a heightened
pleading standard poses for plaintiffs, bemoaning that "[a]
190. Id. at *10.
191. Id. at *30.
192. Id.
193. Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64619, at *31 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2009).
194. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), rev'g Iqbal v.
Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2009)).
195. Id. at *33 (noting that defendants moved to dismiss three of Ibrahim's
constitutional claims, but did not challenge her Fourth Amendment claim,
which survived the motion to dismiss at issue here).
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good argument can be made that the Iqbal standard is too
demanding" because "[vlictims of discrimination and profiling
will often not have specific facts to plead without the benefit
of discovery.""' However, the judge acknowledged that his
hands were tied by Iqbal because the court "must follow the
law as laid down by the Supreme Court."1'9 Nevertheless,
recognizing that discovery would proceed on the surviving
Fourth Amendment claim, the court indicated that Ibrahim
would be permitted to inquire into facts that bore on the
incident during a limited and carefully managed discovery,
and if discovery uncovered evidence of discrimination, she
would be permitted to amend her complaint to reassert her
deficient discrimination claims at that time.198 Furthermore,
the court explicitly requested that no summary judgment
motions or judgments on the pleadings be filed until after the
limited discovery was completed.' 9  Accordingly, the
surviving allegation permitted the trial court to fashion a
judicial remedy that complied with Iqbal's rigorous standard,
but mitigated its harshness.200
V. PROPOSAL
As of today, civil pleading jurisprudence stands
disconnected from the long tradition of liberal notice pleading
and is in a state of upheaval because of the competing policy
objectives of judicial economy and unfettered access to the
courts.2 01 A judicially-fashioned solution, like that presented
in Ibrahim, is one possible resolution to this problem, yet its
efficacy is highly questionable. While the trial court's judicial
creativity permitted Ibrahim's claim to survive to amend
another day, it is unlikely that all cases challenged under
Iqbal will present similar opportunities.2 02 Moreover, the
chance that a sympathetic trial judge will always be willing,
or able, to help a plaintiffs claim proceed to discovery is
dubious at best. Finally, the case-by-case nature of this
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at *33, *40.
199. Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64619, at *40 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2009).
200. Id. at *33.
201. See Mauro, supra note 13.
202. See Ibrahim, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64619, at *33, *40.
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remedy would produce inconsistencies and seriously
undermine the policy objective of preserving scarce judicial
resources.
A second alternative remedy for the problems posed by
Iqbal's heightened pleading standard would call for a return
to the "careful case management" approach, whereby a case is
permitted to proceed to the discovery phase under strict
judicial supervision.2 0 3 The Supreme Court expressly rejected
this as an unfeasible alternative in Twombly, noting that:
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible
entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out
early in the discovery process . . . given the common
lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking
discovery abuse has been on the modest side. 204
The Iqbal Court espoused a similar view, pointing to the
special circumstances of qualified immunity for government
officials, which are entirely inconsistent with the careful case
management approach.2 0 5 Similarly, Judge Easterbrook, of
the Seventh Circuit, recognized the systematic difficulties of
careful case management, explaining that "Ij]udges can do
little about impositional discovery when parties control the
legal claims to be presented and conduct the discovery
themselves."2 06 Given the substantial precedential and
scholarly discontent with careful case management, it is
unlikely that it can provide an adequate solution to the Iqbal
pleading problem.20 7
A third solution would be legislative action-an approach
that has already been attempted following the Iqbal decision
in May, 2009.208 In July, 2009, Senator Arlen Specter
introduced the "Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009."209
The succinct bill proposed by the Pennsylvania Democrat
203. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007).
204. Id.
205. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (noting that the purpose
of the qualified immunity defense is to allow government officials to avoid
discovery, which can be disruptive and time consuming), rev'g Iqbal v. Hasty,
490 F.3d 143 (2009).
206. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery As
Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 639 (1989)).
207. See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong.
(2009), available at, http:/www.opencongress.org/billlll-sl504/text.
209. Id.
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stated, in relevant part, that "a Federal Court shall not
dismiss a complaint under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, except under the standards set forth
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v.
Gibson."210
More recently, Representative Jerrold Nadler, on behalf
of himself and nine other Representatives, introduced the
Open Access to Courts Act of 2009 in the House of
Representatives.2 1 1 Much like Senator Specter's bill,
Representative Nadler's bill would restore pleading to where
it stood after Conley; however, the latter is far more explicit
with regard to its proposed standard. 212 The bill specifically
reiterates the "no set of facts" standard articulated by the
Court in Conley,213 but goes further by invalidating the
pleading standard articulated in Iqbal.2 14 The bill provides
that "[a] court shall not dismiss a complaint . . . on the basis
of a determination by the judge that the factual contents of
the complaint do not show the plaintiffs claim to be plausible
or are insufficient to warrant a reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."2 15
Furthermore, the bill includes a provision protecting the
formal Rules Amendment process, which provides that the
bill shall govern "except as otherwise expressly provided by
an Act of Congress . . . or by amendments made after such
date to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to the
procedures prescribed by the Judicial Conference under this
chapter."21 6 While the Open Access to Courts Act of 2009 will,
if passed, certainly provide resolution in the form of a brute
force removal of the civil pleading standard imposed by Iqbal,
this solution's desirability is less clear. If there is any truth
to the Twombly majority's observation that "Conley has never
210. Id. §2.
211. Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009),
available at http//www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h4115/text.
212. Id.
213. "A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-
46 (1957).
214. H.R. 4115,
215. Id.
216. Id.
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been interpreted literally,"21 and has "puzzl[ed] the
"1218 hn hprofession for 50 years, then the passage of the bill may
not provide a cogent resolution.
The best alternative would be a formal amendment to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which would provide a
definitive interpretation of the underlying pleading standard.
Moreover, a formal amendment would benefit from the
vetting process to which all Rules amendments are subjected,
which would foster public comment and debate and subject
the amendment to careful scrutiny. 219 The Rules Amendment
process would also likely be the least contentious avenue to a
resolution because of the legitimacy that accompanies such
close scrutiny; furthermore, it is certainly supported by
Supreme Court precedent.220 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly expressed deference to the Rules Amendment
process, first in Leatherman,2 2 1 and again in Crawford-El.2 22
Thus, whether or not the Open Access to Courts Act of 2009 is
enacted, an amendment to the Rules is likely the best and
only means by which a uniform pleading standard for all
federal courts can be ensured.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite ongoing scholarly debate over Iqbal's
implications,223 proponents and critics alike can agree that
the post-Iqbal judicial landscape is far less hospitable to
plaintiffs than the pre-Twombly and Iqbal era.224  In a
decision that has resonated throughout the legal profession,
217. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007) (quoting Car
Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).
218. Id. at 563.
219. U.S. Courts, Federal Rulemaking,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProc
ess/SummaryBenchBar.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
220. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
221. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993) ("In the absence of... an amendment, federal
courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and control of discovery to
weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later.").
222. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) ("[O]ur cases
demonstrate that questions regarding pleading, discovery, and summary
judgment are most frequently and most effectively resolved either by the
rulemaking process or the legislative process.").
223. See Steinman, supra note 9, at 1296.
224. See Mauro, supra note 13.
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the Supreme Court appeared to depart from the comfortable
consistency of over fifty years of notice pleading precedent,
replacing it with a new plausibility standard.22 5 While
proponents of the new standard cite judicial economy and
avoidance of frivolous claims,22 6 opponents vigorously argue
that Iqbal is really a "padlock on the courthouse door." 22 7
This debate will only grow in the coming months and years as
Iqbal motions become more and more commonplace in federal
courts around the country.228 The best answer to this
problem is decisive action that will produce a scrutinized and
carefully vetted, durable solution-a solution that the Rules
Amendment process can provide.
225. See Steinman, supra note 9, at 1293.
226. See Mauro, supra note 13.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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